SPARROW V. POND.

SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.
SPARROW V. POND (POND, Intervener).
SYLLABUS.
Growing Crops-Liability to Execution-" Fructus Indus/riales" and

"Fructus Naturales"-Blackberries.
At common law those products of the earth which are annual, are
raised by yearly manurance and labor, and essentially owe their annual
existence to the cultivation of man, termed "emblements," and sometimes "fruclusindustriales," including grain, garden vegetables and the
like, are, even while still annexed to the soil, treated as chattels, and may
be attached or taken in execution.
On the other hand, the fruit of trees, perennial bushes and grasses
growing from perennial roots, and called, by way of contradistinction,
"fructus nalurales," are, while still unsevered from the soil, considered
as pertaining to the realty, and are not subject to attachment or execu-

tion apart from it.
The proper test by which to distinguish between "fruclus industriales" and "fruc/us nalurales" is whether the subject matter will bear
successive crops for years, thus permanently enhancing the value of the
land, or will produce a single crop only, which will be the sole return for
the labor expended.
Blackberry bushes are perennial, and when once planted yield successive crops. Blackberries, therefore, are "fruc/us na/urales," and,
while growing on the bushes, are not subject to levy and sale on execution as personal property.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
Court.
S. T. Litlelon, for appellant. Samuel Lord and Robert Taylor, for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MITCHELL, J. At common law those products of the
earth which are annual, and are raised by yearly manurance and labor, and essentially owe their annual existence to
the cultivation of man, termed " emblements," and sometimes "fruclus induslriales," were, even while still annexed
to the soil, treated as chattels, with the usual incidents
thereof as to seizure on attachment during the owner's life,
and transmission after his death. This class included grain,
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garden vegetables and the like. On the other hand, the
fruit of the trees, perennial bushes and grasses growing
from perennial roots, and called, by way of contradistinction, "fruclus naturales," were, while unsevered from the
the soil, considered as pertaining to the realty, and as such
passed to the heir at the death of the owner, and were not
subject to attachment during his life.' A possible exception to this classification is the case of hops on the vines,
which have been held to be personal chattels, and subject
to sale as such. The ground upon which this seems to be
held is that, although the roots of hops are perennial, the
vines die yearly, and the crop from the new vines is wholly
or mainly dependent upon annual cultivation. The decisions upon that question, however, seem to be all based upon
the old case of Latham v. Atwood.2 It is sometimes stated
that the test whether an unsevered product of the soil is an
emblement, and, as such, personal property, is whether it is
produced chiefly by the manurance and industry of the
owner. But, while this test is correct as far as it goes, it is
incomplete. Under modern improved methods, all fruits
are cultivated, the quality and quantity of the yield depending more or less upon the annual expenditure of lalbor upon
the trees, bushes or vines; but it has never been held that
fruit growing upon cultivated trees was subject to levy as
personal property. No doubt all emblements are produced
by the manurance and labor of the owner, and are called
"fruclus indushriales" for that reason; but the manner, as
well as purpose of planting, is an essential element to be
taken into consideration. If the purpose of planting is not
the permanent enhancement of the land itself, but merely
to secure a single crop, which is to be the sole return for
the labor expended, the product would naturally fall under
the head of "emblements.':
On the other hand, if the
tree, bush or vine is one which requires to be planted but
14

Kent, Comm.; 4 Bac. Abr. 372, tit. " Imblements; Freem. Ex'ns,

II3 ; i Schouler, Pers. Prop.,

ioo et seq.; State v. Gemmill, i Houst.
(Del.), 9; Craddock v. Riddlesbarger, 2 Dana, 205 ; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, tit. " Crops ;" Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 Mees. & W., 5Ol.
2 Cro. Car. 515.
See Frank v. Harrington, 36 Barb., 415.
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once, and will then bear successive crops for years, the
planting would be naturally calculated to permanently enhance the value of the land itself, and the product of any
one year could not be said to essentially owe its existence
to labor expended during that year; and hence it would be
classed among "frucus naturales," and the right of emblements would not attach.' This classification is, of course,
more or less arbitrary, but it is the one uniformly adopted
by the courts (unless hops be an exception), and it is the
only one which will furnish a definite and exact rule.
Blackberry bushes are perennial, and when planted once
yield successive crops. They grow wild, but like every other
kind of fruit or berry, are improved by cultivation. The
quantity and quality of the yield is largely dependent upon
the amount of annual care expended upon them, but the
difference in that respect between them and other fruits is
only one ot degree. It seems to us quite clear that at cornmon law such berries, while growing upon the bushes were
not subject to levy on execution as personal property, and
we have no statute changing the rule. Evidently the main
purpose of section 315, c. 66, Gen. St., was, while permitting immature growing crops to be levied on, to prohibit
their sale until they were ripe and fit to be harvested. The
word "crops" had, long before this statute, acquired in
law a meaning synonymous with or equivalent to the coinmon-law term "emblements," and neither of them included
fruits of perennial trees or shrubs, and it is to be presumed
that the term "crops " is used in the statute in this same
sense. The only change effected by the statute as to the
kinds of products of the earth which may be levied on, while
still attached to the soil is, perhaps, to include perennial
grasses. As we are of opinion that these berries, while
growing on the bushes, were.not subject to levy as personal
property, it becomes unnecessary to consider any other question in the case. To prevent misapprehension hereafter, it
may be well, however, to say, with reference to the quesI Darlington, Pers. Prop., 26.
39
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tion whether crops growing; upon a homestead under the
statutes of the State are subject to levy, or whether their
seizure would be an interference with the beneficial use
and control of the homestead by the debtor, that it is not
determined, as counsel for appellant assume, by the case of
Erickson v. Patterson. I In that case the grain grew upon
land entered under the United States Homestead Law, by
the provisions of which the land was not liable for debts
contracted prior to the issuing of the patent, the exemption
not being at all dependent upon occupancy and user as a
home. Hence that case would not necessarily control the
question discussed in the present case. Judgment affirmed.
LEvY ON GROWING CROPS.
I.-Although, as a general rule,
growing crops are a part of the
land to which they are attached
(Preston v. Ryan, 45 Mich., 174),
and, if belonging to the owner of
the land, will pass by a sale of it,
either voluntary or under execution, unless specially reserved:
Terhune v. Elberson, 2 Pa., 726;
Bear v. Bitzer, i6 Pa., i75; Hendrickson v. Ivins, Saxton, 522;
Bloom v. Welsh, 3 Dutch., 177;
Foote v. Colvin, 3 Johns., 222;
Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cowen, 4o;
Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cowen, 754;
Gillett v. Balcom, 6 Barb. (N. Y.),
370; Crews v. Pendleton, i Leigh
(Va.), 297; Pitts v. Hendrix, 6 Ga.,
452; Jones v. Thomas, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.), 42S; Floyd v. Ricks, 14
Ark., 286; Rankin v. Kinsey, 7 Ill.
App., 25; Dail v. Freeman, 92 N.
C., 351. Contra, Houts v. Showalter, ,o Ohio St., 124, yet, if they
are such as are produced by annual
labor and cultivation, they are to
be regarded and treated iu most
respects as personal chattels. As
such, they may be conveyed by
parol, go to the executor or ad' 5o N. W. Rep. (Minn.), 699.

ministrator instead of to the heir,
and may be levied upon and sold
under execution : 4 Bac. Abr. Exrs.
and Admrs. (H.) i, Bouvier's Ed.
(1844), p. 83; Brittain v. McKay, i
Ired. (N. C. L.), 265; Westbrook v.
Eager, i Harrison (i6 N. J. L.), 81;
Kimball v. Sattley, 55 Vt., 285.
Such crops are known as fructus
industriales, to distinguish them
from the perennial products of the
earth, such as timber, grass and the
fruits of trees, which are called
fruclus naturales, and are considered and treated as part of the
realty, until severed from it in fact
or in law. They are also termed in
law emblements, and, properly
speaking, include only the profits
of sown land; but the name has
been extended not only to growing
crops of corn and grain, but also to
roots planted and other annual
artificial profits: Smith v. Tritt, i
Dev. & Bat. (N. C. L.), 241; S. C.,
28 Am. Dec., 565. There was formerly a widely-spread idea, however, that evenfructus indusiriales,
while still growing and deriving
nutriment from the soil, were to be
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regarded as part of the realty so far
as their seizure in execution was
concerned, and that they became
stamped with the character of personalty for all purposes only when
ripe, and, therefore, no longer inintimately connected with the land,
but ready to be severed from it. In
other words, that their personal
nature depended upon an implied
severance, due to the fact of maturity. This view is strongly hinted
at in some comparatively late cases:
Warwick v. Bruce, 2 M. & S., 205;
Parker v. Staniland, i i East, 362 ;
Heard v. Fairbanks, 5 Mete. (Mass.),
Iii; Mulligan v. Newton, 16 Gray
But this doctrine
(Mass.), 21 .
was" too whimsical to survive the
application of modern practical
legal principles; and it is now
firmly established that annual
crops, raised by yearly labor and
cultivation, are to be regarded as
personal chattels, independent of
and distinct from the land, without
regard to whether they are still
growing or have matured and
ceased to derive any nutriment
from the soil: Garth v. Caldwell,
72 Mo., 622.
II.-Amongfruclus industriales,
and, therefore, liable to be taken in
execution, have been classed grain
of all kinds, wheat, rye, oats and
corn, and presumably rice, barley
and buckwheat: Poole's case, I
Salk., 368; Peacock v. Purvis, 2
Brod. & Bing., 362; Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cowen, 39; Green v. Armstrong, i Den., 55o; Shepard v.
Philbrick, 2 Den., 174; Whipple v.
Foot, 2 Johns., 418; S. C., 3 Am.
Dec., 442; Stewart v. Doughty, 9
Johns., o8 ; Hartwell v. Bissell, 17
Johns., 128; Stambaugh v. Yeates,
2 Rawle, 161 ; Backenstoss v. Stahler, 33 Pa., 251; Hershey v. Metzgar, 9o Pa., 217; Long v. Seavers,
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Pa., 517; Westbrook v. Eager,
supra; Penhallow v. Dwight, 7
Mass., 34; S. C. 5 Am. Dec., 21;
Heard v. Fairbanks, supra; Mulligan v. Newton, sutfra; Smith v.
Tritt, ufira; Carson v. Browden,
2 Lea (Tenn.), 7o1; Erickson v.
Patterson, 5o N. IV. Rep., 699; cotton: McKenzie z, Lampley, 31
Ala., 526; Devore v. Kemp, 3 Hill
(S. C.). 259; pease, beans, tares,
hemp, flax, saffron: I Vashb. Real
Pr., 102; Coombs v. Jordan, 3
1o3

Bland. Ch. on p. 312, S. C. 22 Am.

Dec., 286; cabbage: Ross v. Welch,
ii Gray, 77 Mass., 235; Mulligan
v. Newton, supra; broom corn:
Bowman z,. Com., 8 Ind., 58; tobacco: Coombs v. Jordan, sura;
melons: 4 Bac. Abr., p. 83, Exrs.
and Admrs. (H.), i ; I Vashb.
Real Pr., 102, and, in general, all

vegetables : Backenstoss v. Stabler,
supra. All annual roots, also, such
as potatoes: 'Warwick v. Bruce, 2
M. aud S., 205; Parker v. Staniland, ii East, 362; Evans v. Roberts, 5 B. and C., 828; Jones v.
Flint, io Ad. and El., 753; Sainsbury v. Matthews, 4 Al. and W.,
343; Heard v. Fairbanks, sufira;
Mulligan v. Newton, sufira; carrots: Coombs v. Jordan, supra ;
parsnips: 4 Bac. Abs., supra; 9
Vin. Abr., 371, pl. 70, and turnips,

Dunne v. Ferguson, Hayes, 546,
although they go to the heir, and
not to the executor, according to
Bacon and Viner in the passages
cited, on account of a fancied injury to be done to the inheritance
by digging them, may, nevertheless, be now taken in execution as
personal chattels, notwithstanding
the decision in Emerson v. Heelis,
2 Taunt., 38, that turnips were
fructus naturales. In short, all
crops of a purely annual nature,
including even sugar-cane and pep-
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permint, are personal chattels, and
may be taken in execution.
Among fructus naturales have
been classed growing or standing
timber (4 Bac. Abr., supra; Green
v. Armstrong, i Den., 55o; Slocum
v. Seymour, 36 N. J. L., 138; Putney v. Day, 6 N. H., 43o; Olmstead
v. Niles, 7 N. H., 522; Wilson v.
Douglas, io W. N. C., 527), growing
underwood, (Scorell v. Boxall, i
Vounge & J., 396), fruit trees
(Adams v. Smith, Breese, 221), and
the fruit thereon, such as apples,
pears, cherries, quinces, plums,
apricots, peaches, and presumably
oranges, lemons, bananas, etc. ;
Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 M. & W.,
501; Craddock v. Riddlesbarger, 2
Dana (Ky.), 205 ; Roe v. Gemmill,
I Houst. (Del.), 9, growing grass;
(Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 602;
Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W.,
248; Norris v. Watson, 22 N. H.,
364; S. C., 55 Am., Dec., 16o), and
nuts of all kinds, chestnuts, shellbarks, almonds, walnuts, and the
like (Anon., Freem. Ch., 210).
With these, according to Sparrow
v. Pond (Minn.), 52 N. W. Rep.,
36, (the principal case), should
be included blackberries, and by
analogy all berries, as raspberries
and strawberries, and also gooseberries, currants and grapes, which
are the annual produce of perennial roots or plants. There has
been some difference of opinion in
regard to plants which are not
strictly of either annual or perennial nature, but which have to be
replaced after a limited number of
years, of which clover is perhaps
the most widely known example.
In Williams on Executors, 454, it
is suggested that these, because of
the greater care and labor necessary for their production, were to
be classed with fivi cus indus-

triales;but this view was rejected,
so far at least as clover was concerned, in Evans v. Iglehart, 6 Gill
& J., 171, on the ground that, conceding that it was not a perennial
grass, "neither is it a grass of one
year only, nor the subject of cultivation after it is sown." With
regard to the purely annual grasses,
such as sainfoin, and the so-called
Hungarian grass (which is really a
grain), there can be no doubt that
they are to be considered, like any
other annual crop, as frucius industriales,and therefore liable to
levy and sale under execution.
Some products, however, which
would seem at first glance to fall
naturally into the division of fructus naturales,have been held by
the courts to be frucus industriales. The most prominent of
these exceptions is that of hops.
These have been almost uniformly
regarded as personal property
Latham v. Atwood, Cro. Car., 515 ;
Anon. Freem. Ch., 210; Frank v.
Harrington, 36 Barb. (N. Y.), 415.
Contra, Waddington v. Bristow, 2
Bos. & P., 452, on the ground that,
although they grow out of perennial roots, the vines die yearly,
and the annual crop therefore depends in a great degree upon the
annual labor and manuring of the
owner, and is to be considered as
really an annual product. Crude
turpentine, usually known as
"scrape," is treated as personal
property while still adhering to the
trees, because "it is not the spontaneous product of the trees, but
requires annual labor and cultivation." Lewis v. McNatt, 65 N. C.,
65. Trees in a nursery, also,
planted for the temporary purpose
of cultivation until they are old
enough to sell, are to be regarded
as personal property for most pur-
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poses, and the tenant may sell
them, because such in his trade.
Vyndham v. Way, 4 Taunt., 316 ;
Penton v. Robart, 2 East., 88; Miller v. Baker, I Metc. (42 Mass.),
27; Whitmarsh v. 'Walker, Id.,
313; Maples v. Millon, 31 Conn.,
598. The same rule would apply
to plants and bulbs raised by a
florist for sale, and also to those,
which, although perennial, are
cultivated for the sake of the annual crop of flowers.
The character of realty impressed
upon fructus nahnrales may be
changed to that of personalty by a
severance from the soil, either
actual, as by felling timber, cutting
grass, or gathering fruit and nuts,
or in law, as by a written conveyance of the subject-matter; and
they will then become subject to
all the incidents of personalty, including liability to seizure in execution. (Smith v. Jenks, r Den.,
58o, S. C. i N. Y., go; McClintock's
App., 71 Pa., 366; Caldwell v.
Fifield, 24 N. J. L., 15o; Favorite
v. Deardorff, 84 Ind., 555.)
A
mere mortgage of growing trees or
grass, however, does not work a
severance until the mortgage becomes absolute by the non-performance of its conditions. Bank
v. Crary, I Barb. (N. Y.), 543. As
between landlord and tenant, a
severance frequently occurs when,
by custom or otherwise, the tenant
becomes entitled to crops which
are ordinarily part of the realty.
Wintermute v. Light, 46 Barb. (N.
Y.), 278. A written agreement by
the landlord that the tenant shall
have the fruit of certain trees after
the termination of the lease, would
certainly work a severance of it
when that event took place. So,
too, a retention of the ownership
or control of the soil by the land-

lord would work a severance of
whatever fruclus e naturales the
tenant was entitled to under the
lease. Even in Louisiana, where
growing crops are expressly dedared by statute to be part of the
immovable, the growing crop of a
tenant is, as to him, a movable,
and hence is liable to levy and sale
by a judgment creditor. (Porche
v. Bodin, 28 La. An., 761 ; Pickens
v. Webster, 31 La. An., 870.)
Although, as has been seen, growing
crops pass by a conveyance of the
land, yet if that conveyance be in
fraud of creditors, and the crops be
such as are liable to execution in
the hands of the grantor, they will
be subjected to the claims of the
creditors. Erickson v. Patterson
(Minn.), 50 N. W. Rep., 699.
III.-The old test by whichfruclus indns/'ialeswere distinguished
from frnc/us naturales was,
whether they were produced by
the annual labor and manurance
of the owner, or were simply the
spontaneous product of the earth.
It is evident at a glance that if
this rule is to be applied strictly
now, it will lead to very different
results from those to which it
formerly led. When it was adopted,
the art of growing fruit, as at
present understood, was practically
unknown.
There was but little
market for its sale, and the trees
that were planted, being only for
the owner's own use, were usually
left to take care of themselves,
without any special care or manurance. But all this is now changed,
and, on account of competition and
the ravages of insect pests, fruit
trees are now of necessity cultivated
with extreme care, at least by those
who make it a successful specialty.
This is especially the case with
peaches; and, although, as has
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been noted, one Delaware case
(Roe v. Gemmill, supra), has held
that peaches arefruclusna/trales,
and cannot be taken in execution
while still on the trees; a Maryland
case (Purner v. Piercy, 40 -Md., 212,
S. C. 17 Am. Rep., 591), claims
that "a growing crop of peaches
or other fruit requiring periodical
expense, industry and attention in
its yield and production, may be
well classed as fructus industriales." If this is to hold good, all
cultivated fruits and berries, which
have heretofore been classed as
fruc/us na/urales, must now be
considered and treated as fructus
industriales,and the only fruits to
remain under their old classification be those which, like huckleberries and cranberries, are still
allowed to grow in a wild or semiwild state, with little or no cultivation, except their first planting.
The reasons for rejecting the old
test and its attendant consequences
are very strongly presented in the
preceding opinion, and the criterion
there laid down seems to be much
more in harmony with the spirit of
the common law rule, in view of
the changed circumstances of the
present. The test of manurance
and labor was manifestly only
adopted as a convenient arbitrary
method of deciding the question,
not as a fixed and unvarying rule.
The real intention was beyond a
doubt to include among frttc/us
industriales those products only
which were not annexed to the
soil, but which must be renewed
annually by the labor of the owner;
and among fru-chts naturales all
those which remained permanently
fixed, for a greater or less period,
in the ground, and so became part
of the freehold. It was on this
principle that roots, although an-

nual, were at first held to go to the
heir instead of to the executor;
and that turnips, in Emerson z,.
Heelis, sufra, were held to be
frucus na/tzriales; and it may
well be assumed that the present
doctrine that they are. personal
property is due not so much to the
labor and cultivation required for
raising them, as to their annual,
perishable, transitory nature, which
effectually precludes any thought
of their ever becoming fixed and
permanent in the soil. The true
test, then, is the relation that the
products of the land bear to it;
whether they are so permanent as
to become part and parcel of it, or
are merely a temporary intrusion,
so to speak; and the matter of
labor is only a convenient, but
now, owing to the change of conditions, a misleading arbitrary distinction, which has no controlling
weight, and should be disregarded
whenever it conflicts with the fundamental principle enunciated
above.
IV.-The levy upon a growing
crop may be made at any time
after it has been planted; or if it
be raised from seed, at any time
after the seed has been sown, even
before it is up; for the crop is
growing in contemplation of law as
soon as the seed has been sown:
Ayers v. Hawk (N. J.), xi AtI., 744;
Hare v. Pearson, 4 Ired. (N. C. L.),
76; Gillitt v. Truax, 27 Minn., 528.
It was held, however, in Burleigh
v. Piper, 51 Iowa, 649, that a levy
put into the sheriff's hands on May
2, with instructions not to sell until
the grain had been harvestd and
stacked, was not valid against a
chattel mortgage of the crop made
subsequent to the levy, on the
ground that the circumstances
showed an intention on the part of
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the judgment creditor to hold the
levy as a security merely; and
that, as the writ could not be fully
executed during its lifetime, the
debtor would be put to the expense
of a new writ. But this argument
is very feeble in view of the fact
that it is unquestionably for the
advantage of the debtor that the
sale be delayed until the crop be
ripe, when something near its
value may be realized; and, as
will be seen, not only is the weight
of authority in favor of such a
course, but several States have express statutory provisions that the
sale of a growing crop under execution shall not take place until it
is matured and fit to be gathered.
The levy upon a growing crop
need not be made in the same
manner as a levy upon other chattels. The rules of law governing
such a levy are peculiar to the
subject-matter, and do not require
any act on the part of the officer,
so far as the levy is concerned,
which, if it were not for the protection of the writ, would make
him a trespasser. Actual possession or custody on the part of the
officer would be both unnecessary
and impossible as long as the farm
on which the crop is growing is in
the actual possession of the de-.
fendant: Johnson v. Walker, 37
N. IV. Rep., 639. It is sufficient
for him to go upon the premises
and announce that he seizes the
crop to answer the exigencies of
the writ, or call disinterested parties to witness his open assertion
of the levy: Bilby v. Hartman, 29
Mo. App, 125, or go upon the
premises and notify the persons interested that he has made the levy:
Barr v. Cannon, 6 Iowa, 20. An
attachment upon an unripe growing crop in possession of the de-

fendant is sufficiently levied by
serving upon him copies of the
writ and statutory notice: Raventas
v. Green, 57 Cal., 254In States where growing crops
are liable to seizure, the lien of
the execution binds them from the
date of its teste, or its delivery to
the sheriff: .Edwards v. Thompson,
85 Tenn., 720: McKenzie z. Lampley, 31 Ala., 526; Lindley v. Kelley,
But where the right
42 Ind., 294.
of levying upon such crops is limited by statute, the lien of the execution does not attach until the
time when the levy is allowable:
Edwards v. Thompson, "sufira:
Adams v. Tanner, 5 Ala., 740;
Evans v. Lamar, 21 Ala., 333 ; Scolley v. Pollock, 65 Ga., 339. If
other liens, as a chattel mortgage,
for instance, are prior to the levy,
its lien cannot prevail againstthem:
Houk v. Condon, 40 Ohio St., 569,
but after the levy has been made,
the crop, while still remaining on
the land, is not liable to a distress
for rent, for during the time from
the levy until the sale, it is considered as in custodia legis : Smith
v. Tritt, i Dev. & Bat. (N. C. L.),
241. If the crop levied on be such
as is classed among fruclus naturales, the levy is absolutely void;
and a parol permission from the
defendant to the sheriff to seize
such crops is an agreement relating
to an interest in land, and consequently cannot validate the levy:
Bank v. Crary, i Barb. (N. Y.), 543.
Where land is exempt under the
homestead laws the crops growing
thereon, being necessary to its
beneficial enjoyment, are also exempt from levy and sale under execution. (Cox v. Cook, 46 Ga., 301;
Alexander v. Holt, 59 Tex., 205).
V.-Although the levy be made
while the crop is yet growing and
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unripe, the execution creditor is
not obliged to sell it at once; he
may wait until it is ripe (Whipple
v. Foot, 2 Johns. 418, S. C., 3 Am.
Dec., 442), and the death of the defendant in execution before that
time will not affect the validity of
the levy and sale (Eaton v. Southby, Willes, 131). If, after the levy
of an attachment upon a growing
crop. the sheriff does nothing further until itis ripe, when he gathers
it, there is no abandonment of the
levy (Raventas v. Green, 57 Cal.,
254). But, although the general
and proper practice is to wait after
the levy until the crop is ripe and
fit to be gathered, on account of the
injury that it would almost certainly occasion to the debtor to sell
an unripe and growing crop; yet
its personal character, and the right
of levy on it, necessarily carry with
them the right to sell it before it is
ripe, if the execution plaintiff so
elect (Parham v. Tompson, 2 J. J.
Marsh, Ky., 159 ; Stewart v.
Doughty, 9 Johns., io8). It has
been held that the sale should be
as soon as legally possible, because
the duty of preservation and risk
of keeping the crop safe do not devolve upon the officer (Craddock v.
Riddlesbarger, 2 Dana, Ky., 205);
but there is little force in this, for
it is to the manifest advantage of
the debtor that the crop shall bring
as much as possible at the sale,
whenever that takes place, and it is
therefore his interest, and may be
in so far considered his duty, to
see to the preservation and safekeeping of the crop. If it be sold
while still unripe and growing,
however, the title of the purchaser
vests from that time against all
others (Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland
Ch., 284). He has a right to leave
the crop upon the land until its
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maturity, to enter and give it the
necessary cultivation, and to gather
and take it away when ripe (Stewart v. Doughty, sitera; Smith z.
Tritt, supra; Thompson v. Craigmyle, 4 B. Mon., Ky., 391, S. C.
41 Am. Dec., 240; Bloom v. Welsh,
3 Dutch., 177), and is to be allowed
a reasonable time for that purpose
(Smith v. Tritt, sufira; Shannon
v. Jones, 12 Ired., N. C. L., 206).
In order to make a valid sale of
a standing crop, the officer need
not go inside the field; it is sufficient if he be in view of it at such
convenient distance that bidders
can see what is offered and judge
for themselves of the quantity,
quality and value thereof (Skinner
v. Skinner, 4 Ired., N. C. L., 175 ;
McNeely v. Hart, 8 Id., 492). But
a sale of a growing crop under execution, made at the distance of
two miles from the place where the
crop is standing, is void, and passes
no title to the purchaser; for it is
imperative that the crop be in the
presence of the bidders (Smith v.
Tritt, sufpra.
VI.-The interest of the judgment debtor in the crop is often an
important consideration in determining its liability to execution.
When the debtor is the sole owner
of the crop, of course this question cannot arise; but when other
persons have an interest therein it
sometimes becomes a difficult matter to decide. The crops raised by
the labor of a tenant by the curtesy
initiate on land belonging to hiswife
are his, and are liable to execution
for his debts (Pourrier v. Raymond,
i Hannay, 520) ; but a crop raised
on land held by husband and wife
by entireties is held by them in the
same manner as the land itself, and
is not subject to levy and sale on
execution against the husband
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alone (Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind.,
245. S. C., 34 Am. Rep., 254). A
lessee under an ordinary lease is
the sole owner of the crops raised,
as against the lessor, and they are
liable to seizure on execution only
as against him; but when land is
let on shares, or to a so-called cropper, it then becomes a pure question of intention, to be gathered
from the terms of the letting, whether the tenant or the landlord, or
both jointly, is the owner of the
crop, and for whose debts it is liable
to be seized. As a general rule,
the possession of the land is of controlling importance. If the lessor
gives up the entire possession to
the lessee, the latter is sole owner
of the crop (Gordon v. Armstrong,
5 Ired., N. C. L., 409; Waltson v.
Bryan, 64 N. C., 764; if he retain
the entire possession in himself,
the lessee is only a hired servant,
and the title to the crop is in the
lessor (Porter v. Chandler, 27 Minn.
3o); while if the latter retain a partial possession or control only, he
and the lessee are tenants in common of the crop, and it is liable to
execution against either, the purchaser acquiring, of course, a title
to the share of the debtor only.
(Hansen v. Dennison, 7 Ill., App.
73 ; Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Ill., 344;
Johnson v. Hoffman, 53 Mo., 504;
Lowe v. Miller, 3 Gratt., Va., 205;
Stewart v. Doughty, 9Johns., io8;
Thompson v. Mawhinney, 17 Ala.,
367; Ponder v. Rhea, 32 Ark., 435;
Guest v. Opdyke, 31 N.J. L., 552;
Moulton v. Robinson, 27 N. H.,
550). 'When each party is to take
care of his own portion of the crop
when ripe, the share of each is
liable to execution against him
(Lindley v. Kelley, A2 Ind., 294),

and, as a general rule, where the
facts are doubtful, the inclination
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is to hold the parties tenants in
common of the crop, (Alwood v.
Ruckman, 21 Il., 200).
When the agreement is that the
cropper is to receive a portion of
the crop in return for his labor, the
title to the whole of the crop is in
the lessor, and the cropper has no
title to any part of the crop that
can be taken in execution until he
has been assigned his share by the
lessor. McNeely v. Hart, io fred.
(N. C. L.), 63; Rogers v. Colier, 2
Bailey (S. C.), 58; Porter v. Chandler, supra. Where the lease contains a provision that the whole
crop shall be at the control of the
lessor until sold (Esdon v. Colburn,
28 Vt., 631), that the cropper's portion shall be assigned to him after
he shall have paid his employer for
the provisions furnished him while
making the crop (Hunter v. Edmundson, Ga. Dec. Pt. I, p. 74), or
that the entire crop shall be the
property of the lessor until all advances made by him to the tenant
shall be repaid (Howell v. Foster,
65 Cal. 169), the lessee has no interest in the crop that can be attached or taken in execution, until
he has complied with all the conditions of the lease. But when the
share of the crops reserved to the
lessor is in the nature of rent merely,
the tenant has the exclusive possession of thesoil, and consequently
of the crop also; and the lessor,
before his share is assigned to him,
has no interest that can be levied
upon. Gordon v. Armstrong, supra; Williams v. Smith, 7 Ind.,
559; Woodruff v. Adams, 5 Blackf.
(Ind.), 317; Chissom v. Hawkins,
ii Ind., 316; Devore v. Kemp, 3
Hill (S. C.), 259; Harrison v. Ricks,
71 N. C., 7; Howard Co. v. Kyte,
28 N. W. Rep., 609. In such a
case, however, the crop may be
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taken in execution against the lessee. Sargent v. Courrier, 66 Ill.,
245VIl.-In some States, certain
crops have been exempted from execution (Carpenter v. Ierrington,
25 Wend., 370; Horgan v. Amick,
62 Cal. 4oI); and in others, the
common law right of levy has been
limited by statute. The Louisiana
Code (Art. 465) does away with the
distinction between fructus industriales and fruclus taturales, providing that "standing crops and
the fruit of trees not gathered, and
trees before they are cut down, are
likewise immovable, and are considered as part of the land to which
they are attached." In Alabama,
the Act of 1821 (Aik. Dig., sec. 41,
p. 167), provided that "it'shall not
be lawful for any sheriff or other
officer to levy a writ of fieri facias
or other execution, on the planted
crop of a debtor . . . . until the
crop is gathered." This, however,
was repealed within a few years.
In North Carolina, the Act of 1844,
ch. 35, prohibited officers from
levying executions upon "growing
crops," which was held, in Shannon v. Jones, suifra, to embrace
only crops which were not matured.
The Georgia Code, sec. 3642, enacts
that "no sheriff or other officer
shall levy upon any growing crop
usually raised or cultivated
.....
by the planters or farmers of this
State, nor sell the same until such
crop shall be matured and fit to be
gathered." Under this Act it was
held, in Scolley v. Pollock, 65 Ga.,
339, that cotton in the field, not
matured, was not liable to levy and
sale, and the purchaser of th'e crop
in its then condition from the defendant, obtained a good title
against an execution taken out previously. The Tennessee Code (M.

& V., sec. 3749) exempts a growing corn crop from execution until
the i~th of November; and the
Civil Code of Kentucky forbids the
levy and sale of a growing crop
until October i. In this latter State,
however, there is a very wise and
just provision (sec. 439 of the Code),
which allows such a crop, after a
return of "no property" upon an
execution, to be subjected to the
payment of a creditor's claim by a
proceeding in equity.
There are some strong objections
to be urged against the statutory
provisions which absolutely forbid
the levy upon a growing crop; for
they in effect allow the debtor to
wholly defeat the just claims of his
creditors by aliening the land, with
which the crop passes as an incident, before its maturity. "It is,
in effect, a gift to the defendant in
execution of the growing crop, provided he does not gather it himself,
but disposes of it in its then condition." ORMOND, J., diss. in Adams
v. Tanner, 5 Ala., 740. It is true
that the crop was liable to be sacrificed, under the common law rule,
by a sale while it was unripe; but
there was comparatively little danger of this, for it was equally to the
disadvantage of the creditor, and,
as has been seen, the usual practice was to delay the sale until the
crop was ripe, the lien of the levy
meanwhile making the creditor secure. In their anxiety to protect
the debtor, the legislatures seem to
have forgotten the creditor, who
has equally strong claims to their
protection. Such a course as that
adopted in Kentucky, or that taken
in Michigan (Howell's Ann. Stat.,
sec.' 7685) and Minnesota (Gen.
Stat., 1878, c. 66, sec. 315), which
permits the levy of the execution,
but forbids the sale of the crop until

